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1MERGER POLICY IN R&D INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES
Ram¶ on Faul¶ ia n dM a i t eP a s t o r
ABSTRACT
We analyze merger policy in an industry where ¯rms participate in a non-
tournament R&D competition. We conclude that merger policy should be, in
general, less restrictive in high technology markets (pharmaceuticals and tele-
coms), because mergers reduce the wasteful duplication of R&D expenditures.
However, merger policy should become more strict in (very) asymmetric market
structures. In this case, competition provides incentives for R&D, but, at the
same time, duplication is avoided.
KEYWORDS: Mergers; Antitrust; Research and Development.
21 Introduction.
In the last years, we have observed an increase in the number of mergers in
di®erent sectors of economic activity. These processes are motivated by di®erent
strategic responses to a changing environment: "(M)any of today's (mergers)
are defensive. Frightened by contracting markets (the defensive industry); by
falling commodity prices (oil); by excess capacity in key markets (cars); by the
uncertainties of technological change (banks and telecoms); or by the soaring
costs of research (pharmaceuticals): companies in many industries think they are
more likely to prosper if they are huge than merely large" (The Economist 9th
January 1999)).
These phenomena demands a clear policy from antitrust authorities. This task
is not easy, because antitrust laws were originally designed to apply to traditional
manufacturing industries and it is not far from controversy if they can be used to
deal with high technology markets. In the traditional sectors, the main question
is to compare the e®ect on price with possible cost reductions induced by the
merger. This is the basic trade-o® analyzed in the US Merger Guidelines. The
question is whether this framework can be used to analyze the welfare impact
of mergers in high technological sectors where other factors, like the quality of
goods and the pace of innovation, come into play. These new factors are important
because in those industries ¯rms not only compete in prices but in the level of
R&D as well.
The way merger policy should be adapted in R&D intensive industries is
not clear. The e®ect of competition on the welfare impact of R&D expenditure
is uncertain. Sometimes, competition may induce an excessive expenditure in
R&D (Lee and Wilde (1980)), but we may also have situations where the lack
of competition reduce the incentives to innovate. The antitrust authority should
decide which of the two e®ects dominates in each case.
We carry our analysis in two di®erent models: the strategic and the non-
3strategic case. In the non-strategic case, R&D decisions are only driven by cost
reducing considerations. In the strategic case, they will also be used to a®ect the
decisions of the competitors. By comparing the two contexts, we can isolate the
strategic role played by R&D expenditures. These two scenarios are common in
the literature dealing with R&D competition, for example, Tandon (1984) models
competition as in the ¯rst scenario and Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1993) as
in the second scenario.
We want to analyse these models in a context where ¯rms have di®erent cost
structures (asymmetric context). We also want to analyse the e®ect of the number
of ¯rms on the optimal merger policy. For this reason, we propose a model where
¯rms have identical cost structures (symmetric context).
Despite the diversity of environments we analyse, a clear conclusion arises:
merger policy should be less restrictive in R&D intensive industries. This idea
common among practitioners and managers, shares the schumpeterian view that
concentration has a positive e®ect on technological progress (Acs and Audretsch
(1988)).
The main advantage that mergers have in these sectors is that the more con-
centrated the market the more easily ¯rms can appropriate the returns of their
R&D investments (Levin, Cohen and Mowery (1985)). In other words, mergers
induce a lower duplication of R&D expenditures by allowing merging ¯rms to
concentrate their innovation activities.
An important exception to the previous general idea appears in the strategic
case when ¯rms are asymmetric. In this case, the merger between an e±cient
and an ine±cient ¯rm reduces welfare. The reason being that the ine±cient
¯rm stimulates the R&D expenditure of the e±cient one. At the same time,
this reduces the R&D made by the ine±cient ¯rms which avoids the duplication
of R&D expenditures. In this case, competition increases welfare, because we
have that R&D expenditure is stimulated but not duplicated. The fact that
4the existence of (very) ine±cient ¯rms can increase welfare departs from the
traditional point of view of merger policy.
The asymmetric and symmetric contexts are analysed respectively in Sections
2 and 3. In each Section, the strategic and nonstrategic models are analyzed in
di®erent subsections. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 4
2 The Asymmetric Model
We have two ¯rms, ¯rm 1 and 2, competing in a market with inverse demand
given by p = A¡Q where Q is total output and p is price. Firm i's cost function
i sa s s u m e dt ob eo ft h ef o r m :
Ci (xi;q i)=( ci ¡ xi)qi + °x
2
i
where xi and qi denote the level of R&D1 and the production of ¯rm i respec-
tively. We assume that Firm 1 is more e±cient, c1 <c 2. This cost function
corresponds to the one used in d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) for the case
without spillovers2.
It is assumed that ° ¸ 1. This guarantees that the second order conditions are
satis¯ed. Observe that ° represents the e®ectiveness of R&D investment. When
° increases the expenditure to obtain a given cost reduction also increases.3 The
1If goods were di®erentiated, the present formulation could be reinterpreted as if R&D
a®ected the quality of goods. This extension is left for future research.
2Introducing spillovers will lead us naturally to consider intermediate forms of competition
as Research Joint Ventures. To focus on the comparison between full competition and full
cooperation, we prefer to suppress spillovers in the speci¯cation of the cost function.
3The present model can accomodate the introduction of a parameter (¯)t h a tr e ° e c t sR & D
productivity (see Barros and Nilssen (1998)). Suppose that the cost function is given by:
Ci (xi;q i)=( ci ¡ ¯yi)qi ¡ ±y2
i
where yi is the level of R&D.
5case without R&D investment is obtained in the limit case when ° tends to
in¯nity.
Firms decide both the level of R&D and the level of output. We will con-
sider two di®erent scenarios depending on the timing of the decisions. In the
¯rst scenario (Non Strategic model), R&D and output are chosen by both ¯rms
simultaneously. In the second scenario (Strategic model), R&D is decided prior
to output.
The Non Strategic model consists of a game where all decisions are taken in the
same stage. In the Strategic model we have a two stage game where in a ¯rst stage,
the R&D decisions are taken and once they are publicly known, output decisions
are taken in a second stage. The di®erence between both models lies in the role
played by R&D decisions. In the ¯rst model, they are driven only by cost reducing
considerations. In the second, we must also take into account the in°uence they
have on market competition in the second stage. These two scenarios are common
in the literature dealing with R&D competition, for example, Tandon (1984)
models competition as in the ¯rst scenario and Okuno-Fujiwara & Suzumura
(1993) as in the second scenario.
We are interested in the e®ect on welfare of market structure. Therefore we
have to study what happens when both ¯rm merge to form a monopoly. In this
case, both scenarios coincide. However we have to specify the cost function of
the merged entity.
If we de¯ne xi = ¯yi, the cost function can be rewritten as:




This is exactly the formulation presented in the text if ° = ±
¯2. Therefore, increases in ° can
also be interpreted as decreases in R&D productivity.
6We consider that the cost structure is not altered by the merger4,t h a ti s








This implies that R&D and production will be concentrated in the most e±-
cient technology. The merged ¯rm will optimally choose q2 =0a n dx2 =0 . 5
To study the duopoly case we de¯ne the pro¯ts of ¯rm 1 and 2. They are
given respectively by:
¦1 =( A ¡ c1 + x1 ¡ q1 ¡ q2)q1 ¡ °x
2
1
¦2 =( A ¡ c2 + x2 ¡ q1 ¡ q2)2 ¡ °x
2
2
They can be rewritten the following way:


















¦2 =( A ¡ c1)
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Higher values of t represent higher asymmetries between ¯rms.
To compute the equilibrium of the model becomes simpler if ¯rms are assumed







¼1 =( 1+X1 ¡ Q1 ¡ Q2)Q1 ¡ °X
2
1
¼2 =( 1¡ t + X2 ¡ Q1 ¡ Q2)Q2 ¡ °X
2
2
This way of solving the model highlights the fact that the relevant parameters
of the model can be reduced to ° (the e®ectiveness of R&D) and t (the degree of
asymmetry between ¯rms).
4Observe that this means that the research developed in ¯rm 2 can not be used to reduce
the cost of producing the good in ¯rm 1.
5See footnote 11 in d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
72.1 Non Strategic model




(A ¡ c1)2° (¡1+2 ° (1 + t))




(A ¡ c1)2° (¡1+2 ° + t(1 ¡ 4°))




(A ¡ c1)(¡1+2 ° (1 + t))




(A ¡ c1)(¡1+2 ° + t(1 ¡ 4°))




: Otherwise, we have the same situation as with merger. These
results are obtained solving the following equilibrium conditions
@¦i
@qi
=0w h e ni =1 ;2
@¦i
@xi
=0w h e ni =1 ;2
9
> > > =
> > > ;
(1)
The e±cient ¯rm invests in R&D more than the ine±cient one. The di®erence




, the ine±cient ¯rm does not invest and does not produce.
Social welfare is assumed to be the sum of consumer surplus and ¯rms pro¯ts.
Given outputs q1 and q2,a n dR & Dl e v e l sx1 and x2 is given by:
W(q1;q 2;x 1;x 2;°)=
Z q1+q2
0
(A ¡ y)dy¡(c1 ¡ x1)q1¡(c2 ¡ x2)q2¡° (x1)
2¡° (x2)
2 =









Therefore the social Welfare in the non-strategic equilibrium where both ¯rms
















We solve ¯rst the case where both ¯rms are active. This will be the case when






. Equilibrium occurs where each
¯rm maximizes its pro¯t with respect to own production given the production
of its rival. The solution to the ¯rst order conditions depends on x1 and x2.
Therefore, in the second stage, ¯rms will produce:
q1 =
(A ¡ c1)((1 + t)+2 x1 ¡ x2)
3
q2 =
(A ¡ c1)((1 ¡ 2t) ¡ x1 +2 x2)
3




(A ¡ c1)(¡4+6( 1+t°))




(A ¡ c1)(¡4+t(4 ¡ 12°)+6 °)
4 ¡ 24° +2 7 °2
These levels of R&D depend on the degree of asymmetries (t) and the e®ectiveness
of R&D (°).




(A ¡ c1)3°(¡2+3( 1+t)°)




(A ¡ c1)3°(¡2+t(2 ¡ 6°)+3 °)
4 ¡ 24° +2 7 °2
The e±cient ¯rm invests in R&D more than the ine±cient one. The di®erence




, the ine±cient ¯rm does not invest and does not produce.
O b s e r v et h a tt h ei n e ± c i e n t¯ r mi se x p e l l e df r o mt h em a r k e tf o ral o w e rv a l u e
of t in the strategic case than in the non strategic case. The reason for this is
that now the R&D decisions have a strategic dimension: the e±cient overinvest
in order to reduce the output sold in Stage 2 by ¯rm 2.

















¯rm 1 invest in R&D to expel ¯rm 2 from









1 =( A ¡ c1)(1¡ 2t)a n dq
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,w eh a v et h es a m es i t u a t i o na sw i t hm e r g e r .
2.3 Monopoly
In equilibrium, it will produce:
q
M =
2° (A ¡ c1)
4° ¡ 1






Social Welfare in equilibrium is given by:
W
M =




102.4 Comparing Welfare in Monopoly and Duopoly
In this section we derive the main results of the paper that refer to the optimal




monopoly independently of the number of ¯rms. Therefore merger policy is not
an issue so that results below concentrate on the remaining values of t.
In the non strategic case, the optimal policy results from comparing expression
(5) with (2) leading to the results stated in proposition 1
Proposition 1 In the non strategic case merger increase welfare when asymme-






1 ¡ 16° +8 0 °2 ¡ 144°3 +8 0 °4
1 ¡ 18° + 116°2 ¡ 328°3 +3 5 2 °4.
.
This proposition con¯rms the result obtained in markets without R&D that
ine±cient ¯rms are prejudicial for welfare6(Lahiri and Ono (1988)). In these cases,
welfare will increase if ine±cient ¯rms merge with more e±cient ¯rm. However,
merger policy should be adapted in R&D intensive industries because the greater
the e®ectiveness of R&D, the smaller the degree of asymmetry between ¯rms




In the strategic case the optimal policy results from comparing expression (5)
with (7) for t ·
3° ¡ 2
2(3° ¡ 1)







comparisons leads to the results stated in proposition 2.
6Observe that the case without R&D can be obtained in our model by letting ° tend to
in¯nity. In this case merger increase welfare when t ¸ 5
22.
11Proposition 2 In the strategic case merger increases welfare for the intermediate
values of the asymmetries t(°) · t · t(°)
t(°)=
(¡2+3 °)(8¡ 44° +4 8 °2)+
q
2° (¡20 + 136° ¡ 243°2 + 162°3)
(¡1+4 °)(16¡ 78° +9 9 °2)
t(°)=
(¡2+3 °)(8¡ 44° +4 8 °2) ¡
q
2° (¡20 + 136° ¡ 243°2 + 162°3)
(¡1+4 °)(16¡ 78° +9 9 °2)
Observe that in the strategic case the presence of very ine±cient ¯rms can
have a positive e®ect on welfare. In monopoly, the level of R&D is insu±cient.
Then, the competition provided by an ine±cient ¯rm has a positive e®ect. On
the one hand, it stimulates the R&D of the ine±cient ¯rm. On the other hand,
the asymmetry guarantees that this is done without duplication of R&D, because








, even though ¯rm 2 does not
produce in the duopoly equilibrium the merger would reduce welfare. This is the
extreme case of what we are saying: ¯rm 2 stimulates the R&D investment of
¯rm 1 and we have no duplication, because ¯rm 2 does not invest in R&D.
Comparing the two previous results we have that merger policy should be
more restrictive in the strategic case. It is possible to check that tN(°) <t (°).
The reason is that welfare in duopoly is greater in the strategic case than in the
non-strategic case. This result was identi¯ed by Brander and Spencer (1983) for
the symmetric case.7 We check that it also holds in the asymmetric case.
Our result that product market competition positively a®ects the investment
in R+D is in accordance with the results in d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
The main message of this paper is that, although cooperation in R+D may be
bene¯cial, collusion in the product market reduces both output and investment
in R+D.
7Proposition 5 shows that this is no longer true if the number of ¯rms is greater than 2.
123 The symmetric model
Now, we are interested in studying the e®ect of changes in the number of ¯rms
o nt h ee ± c i e n tm e r g e rp o l i c y( s of a rw eh a v eo n l yl o o k e da tt h ee ® e c to f¯ r m
size). To be able to derive results as a function of n we assume that all ¯rms are
symmetric. In this case the cost function of ¯rms is given by:
C (xi;q i)=( c ¡ xi)qi + °x
2
i
where xi and qi denote the level of R&D and the production of ¯rm i respectively.
The equations above also represents the cost function of merged entities, be-
cause as before we assume that merger does not a®ect the cost structure of ¯rms.
Therefore, ¯rms will optimally concentrate all their R&D expenditures in only
one location. For these reasons, equilibria are symmetric both premerger and
postmerger. This allows to write all equilibria conditions as a function of n as in
Salant et al (1983).
3.1 The non strategic model
Solving for the equation system (1) for i =1 :::n and ci = c we obtain the
equilibrium decisions of ¯rms that are given by:
q
N =
2° (A ¡ c)




2(n +1 )° ¡ 1
We obtain that the level of R&D per ¯rm increases with market concentra-
tion. Therefore, in our model the schumpeterian idea that concentration pushes
innovation holds (Levin, Cohen and Mowery (1985)). Observe that the marginal
cost of ¯rms in the second stage decreases with concentration. Nevertheless, we
have still the standard e®ect that price increases with concentration.










¡ (c ¡ x)nq ¡ n°x
2




2 n° (¡1+2( 2+n)°)
(1 ¡ 2(1+n)°)
2 :
This function is maximized in b n =
8°2 ¡ 6° +1
2°
. This allows to derive the
optimal merger policy in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 A merger that does not reduce the number of independent ¯rms
below int[b n +1 ]increases welfare.
In the limit case when ° tends to in¯nity we obtain that all mergers reduce
welfare, because b n tends to in¯nity. This is the same result as in the symmetric
model without R&D.
The previous Proposition is useful if one thinks that the Government has
the power to a®ect market structure through sponsoring mergers. However, in
many countries, for example the US, compulsory action or subsidies to encourage
mergers go against the normal practice of antitrust policy. In this case, the
antitrust authority can only accept or reject mergers that are proposed. Then a
su±cient condition for a merger to increase welfare is that its e®ect on consumers
and competitors (external e®ect of a merger) be positive, because it is logical to
assume that mergers that are proposed are pro¯table. This approach to resolve
merger cases was proposed by Farrell and Shapiro (1990).8
8If applied in Section 2, all mergers would have to be forbidden, because they reduce con-
sumers surplus.
14Suppose that in a N ¯rm industry, k+1 ¯rms propose to merge. This implies
that the merger is pro¯table. When
¼(N ¡ k) < (k +1 ) ¼(N)
pro¯tability is obtained by assuming that there are savings in ¯xed costs. The
external e®ect of this merger is given by:
W(N ¡ k) ¡ ¼(N ¡ k) ¡ (W(N) ¡ (k +1 ) ¼(N)) (6)
The following Proposition ¯nds when (6) is positive.
Proposition 4 In a N ¯rm industry the external e®ect of a merger is positive
i® the market share of merging ¯rm is lower than h(°). We have that h0(°) < 0.
Proof. De¯ne:
M(k)=W(N ¡ k) ¡ ¼(N ¡ k) ¡ (W(N) ¡ (k +1 ) ¼(N))
M(k)=0i fk =0 ;k = k1 and k = k2.A s k2 >N¡ 1a n dM0(0) > 0, we









Then we have h0(°) < 0.
This proposition con¯rms the result obtained in markets without R&D that
the external e®ect of mergers is positive if the market share of merging ¯rms is
low enough (Farrell and Shapiro (1990)). However, as in Proposition 1, merger
policy should be adapted in R&D intensive industries because the higher the
e®ectiveness of R&D, the higher the market share of merging ¯rms needed for
the external e®ect to be negative. This result comes from the fact that h0(°) < 0.
153.2 The strategic model
In the second stage, ¯rm i pro¯ts, given that its R&D investment has been xi





















Imposing symmetry (xi = x) in the ¯rst order condition the equilibrium is ob-
tained.
q =
A ¡ c + x
(n +1 )




n2° +2 n° + ° ¡ n
Therefore the quantity produced in equilibrium is:
q
SS =
(A ¡ c)(n +1 ) °
n2° +2 n° + ° ¡ n
As in the non strategic case, we have that R&D investment per ¯rm and price
increase with concentration.
Social Welfare in equilibrium is given by:
W
SS =
n°(A ¡ c)2 (2° +5 n° + n3° + n2 (¡2+4 °))
2(° + n2° + n(¡1+2 °))
2 (7)





° (3n2 (¡1+°)° + °2 + n° (1 + 3°)+n3 (1 ¡ 4° + °2))
(¡n + ° +2 n° + n2°)
3 ;
it is positive for °>b ° because then 1 ¡ 4° + °2 > 0:
Comparing propositions 3 and 5 we have that when the e®ectiveness of the
R&D is low (°>b °), merger policy should be more strict in the strategic case than
in the nonstrategic case. In the former case, mergers always reduce welfare while
in the latter case, they increase welfare whenever there are more than int[b n +1 ]
¯rms in the postmerger equilibrium. However, when the e®ectiveness of the R&D
is high, it is no longer true that merger policy should be more strict in the strategic
case. For example, when ° = 2, in the strategic case mergers increase welfare
whenever there are more than 3 ¯rms in the postmerger equilibrium, while in the
nonstrategic case the threshold increases up to 5.
Comparing the strategic and non strategic case we have that welfare is greater
in the latter case for n ¸ 3 (see Proposition 6 below). This is the opposite result
that Brander and Spencer (1983) obtained for the case with two ¯rms.
Proposition 6 Welfare is greater in the non strategic case than in the strategic





where T(n)=2 n + n
2 ¡ 4n
3 + n






0(n)=2+2 n ¡ 12n
2 +4 n
3 + °(¡6 ¡ 8n +2 4 n
2 +1 6 n
3 ¡ 10n
4)
If n ¸ 3;
T
0(n) <° (4n
3 +2 4 n




As T(3) = ¡12°2, the result of the Proposition follows.
174 Conclusions
The result that increases in concentration may increase social welfare due to the
reduction in the duplication of R&D expenditures, connects our paper with the
schumpeterian theories. It has been studied in previous papers. Therefore, we
consider that our main contribution to the literature is the idea that this approach
may fail in asymmetric market structures.
When we have an e±cient and an ine±cient ¯rm, it is convenient to preserve
competition (forbid the merger). In monopoly, the level of R&D is insu±cient.
Then, the competition provided by an ine±cient ¯rm has a positive e®ect. On
the one hand, it stimulates the R&D of the ine±cient ¯rm. On the other hand,
the asymmetry guarantees that this is done without duplication of R&D, because
the ine±cient ¯rm as it produces very little has very little incentives to spend in
R&D.
As the asymmetric setting looks more intriguing, it looks promising to gener-
alize it in several directions:
The most obvious one is to try to solve the model for more than two ¯rms. This
will allow us to study the type of mergers that are more likely to increase social
welfare: either the ones with symmetric partners or the ones with asymmetric
ones.
One can also introduce product di®erentiation. In this case, while keeping
the present formulation, the expenditure in R&D could be reinterpreted as if it
a®ected the quality of goods. Furthermore, product di®erentiation will allow us
to consider the case of Bertrand competition.
18One could also introduce the possibility that the expenditure in R&D is used
either to reduce costs (process innovation) or to increase the quality of goods
(product innovation). This can be used to test the empirical evidence that shows
that big ¯rms invest more in process innovation inventions while small ¯rms are
more inclined to carry out product innovations investments (Rosen (1991) and
Yin and Zuscovitch (1998)).
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